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 NOTE 
Too Close for Comfort: Protecting 
Agriculture in an Urban Age 
Labrayere v. Bohr Farms, LLC, 458 S.W.3d 319 (Mo. 2015) (en banc). 
Maggie Gibson* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Every American has a daily, intimate, and continuous relationship with 
agriculture.  For most people, this takes the form of the food they eat and the 
clothes they wear.  For others, it extends to the work they do every day to 
produce these things.  But what happens when agriculture gets too close for 
comfort?  Many urbanites, and even other farmers, deal with this problem on 
a daily basis when neighboring farms create a nuisance to them and their 
property.  This problem occurs all over the country but has recently become 
an especially hot topic in Missouri.  The recent passage of the Right to Farm 
amendment will affect this issue, but another, often overlooked, development 
in this struggle was the ruling in Labrayere v. Bohr Farms and the court’s 
interpretation of Missouri Revised Statutes section 537.296. 
Part II of this Note introduces issues in Labrayere v. Bohr Farms, the 
instant case that upheld agricultural protections against nuisance damages.  
Part III of this Note presents some of the historical trends that led to the 
court’s decision in Labrayere.  It also examines Missouri’s closely related 
Right to Farm constitutional amendment.  Finally, in Part IV, the court’s rea-
soning is dissected and future implications of the decision are considered. 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDINGS 
Bohr Farms owns and operates a Concentrated Animal Feeding Opera-
tion (“CAFO”).1  It began this operation in September of 2011 with an oper-
 
* B.A., Tulane University, 2014; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of 
Law, 2017; Lead Articles Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2016–2017.  I am grateful to 
Professor Anne Alexander for her guidance and support during the writing of this 
Note, to the Missouri Law Review for editorial assistance, and to my family for their 
support. 
 1. Labrayere v. Bohr Farms, LLC, 458 S.W.3d 319, 325 (Mo. 2015) (en banc).  
Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations are defined as operations where animals 
“have been, are, or will be stabled or confined and fed or maintained for a total of 45 
days or more in any 12-month period,” and “[c]rops, vegetation, forage growth, or 
post-harvest residues are not sustained in the normal growing season over any portion 
of the lot or facility.” 40 C.F.R. § 122.23 (2016). 
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ating capacity of more than 4000 hogs.2  Cargill Pork LLC owns the hogs and 
contracted with Bohr Farms to raise them.3  The operation site includes a 
sewage disposal system and a composting system for dead hogs.4 
Several surrounding landowners and other individuals (“landowners”) 
filed suit for damages relating to temporary nuisance, negligence, and con-
spiracy because of the odors coming from Bohr Farms.5  They alleged offen-
sive odors, hazardous substances, particulates, flies, manure, and pathogens 
had come onto their property from the CAFO.6  The damages for the tempo-
rary nuisance charge came solely from the landowners’ loss of use and en-
joyment of their property, not from medical expenses or loss of property val-
ue.7 
The landowners also alleged that Bohr Farms was operating negligently.  
Cargill was included in the suit because the landowners believed it to be vi-
cariously liable for Bohr Farms’s nuisance and negligence.8  The landowners 
also alleged that Cargill and Bohr Farms were involved in a conspiracy to 
cause the odors.9  The circuit court entered summary judgment for Bohr 
Farms because the landowners were barred from asserting a claim for loss of 
use and enjoyment damages under section 537.296.10  The circuit court found 
that section 537.296 was constitutional and that it did not authorize a damage 
award for the loss of use and enjoyment of the landowners’ property.11  The 
court went on to deny recovery on both the negligence and civil conspiracy 
claims.12  The landowners appealed to the Supreme Court of Missouri, argu-
ing, inter alia, that section 537.296 was unconstitutional.13 
The landowners argued seven claims on appeal.  First, they argued that 
section 537.296 was unconstitutional because it authorized a private taking.14  
Second, the plaintiffs contended that section 537.296 was unconstitutional 
because it allowed a taking for public use and did not require just compensa-
tion.15  Third, they claimed that section 537.296 was unconstitutional because 
it violated both the state and federal constitutions’ Equal Protection Clauses.16  
Fourth, the plaintiffs argued that section 537.296 was unconstitutional be-
 
 2. Labrayere, 458 S.W.3d at 326. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 325. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 327. 
 11. Id. at 326. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 326–27. 
 14. Id. at 326. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
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cause it denied substantive due process.17  Fifth, they contended that section 
537.296 violated the separation of powers under the Missouri Constitution 
because it defined “standing,” usurping the judiciary’s role.18  Sixth, the 
plaintiffs claimed that section 537.296 violated the open courts provision of 
the Missouri Constitution.19  Seventh, they argued that section 537.296 was a 
special law and therefore violated the prohibition of special laws in the Mis-
souri Constitution.20  Because it found neither a taking without proper com-
pensation nor a violation of equal protection, the Supreme Court of Missouri 
held that section 537.296 was constitutional.21 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
There are several important issues in this case that are discussed in rela-
tion to section 537.296.  This case was the first to narrowly challenge section 
537.296.22  However, the doctrines discussed in relation to this statute, in-
cluding eminent domain and equal protection, have significant independent 
legal histories, as will be discussed in this Part.  This Part begins with a dis-
cussion of the actual laws at issue here – section 537.296 and article I, section 
35 of the Missouri Constitution, commonly known as the “Right to Farm” 
amendment.  Next, it examines the legal theory of eminent domain.  The last 
section of this Part discusses equal protection. 
A.  Section 537.296 and the Right to Farm Amendment 
Section 537.296 became effective on August 28, 2011.23  This statute 
limits private nuisance damages when an agricultural enterprise causes the 
nuisance.24  Section 537.296.2 only allows compensatory damages when the 
cause of the nuisance is animal or crop production on land used primarily for 
that purpose.25  Permanent nuisance damages are measured by the fair market 
value reduction of the property caused by the nuisance.26  Temporary nui-
sance damages are measured by the “diminution in the fair rental value” of 
the property due to the nuisance.27  Only documented medical conditions 
caused by the nuisance are permitted to receive compensatory damages.28 
 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 326–27. 
 22. Id. at 326. 
 23. See MO. REV. STAT. § 537.296 (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
 24. Id. § 537.296.2. 
 25. Id.  
 26. Id. § 537.296.2(1). 
 27. Id. § 537.296.2(2). 
 28. Id. § 537.296.2(3). 
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Any judgment for a landowner’s permanent nuisance claim binds all 
successor landowners to the remedy awarded.29  The only people who have 
standing to bring a private nuisance action against property primarily used for 
animal or crop production are those who have an ownership interest in the 
affected property.30  The statute does not prohibit a person from receiving 
damages for discomfort, annoyance, sickness, or emotional distress, so long 
as those damages are awarded based on some other cause of action, inde-
pendent of the nuisance claim.31  So, for example, a farmer who accidentally 
ran through a neighbor’s fence with his tractor, hitting and injuring his neigh-
bor, could still be liable for damages based on a negligence or similar claim. 
In the intervening time between the passage of section 537.296 and the 
Labrayere case, Missouri voters passed a Right to Farm amendment.  This 
amendment was created in response to new limits on agriculture being im-
posed in other states.32  In the months leading up to the vote, there was much 
debate over the proposed amendment, even within the farming community.33  
While many farmers thought this amendment would protect their industry, 
some believed it favored and protected corporate farms while hurting small 
and family farms because they saw this amendment as a way for corporate 
farms to insulate themselves from environmental and animal welfare regula-
tions.34  The vote, held in August 2014, was very close, with the amendment 
passing with 50.1 percent of voters in support.  In June 2015, the Supreme 
Court of Missouri heard a challenge to the wording of the amendment on the 
ballot, and it upheld the amendment.35 
After its passage, the Right to Farm amendment became part of the Mis-
souri Constitution as article I, section 35.36  The new amendment states: 
That agriculture which provides food, energy, health benefits, and se-
curity is the foundation and stabilizing force of Missouri’s economy.  
To protect this vital sector of Missouri’s economy, the right of farmers 
and ranchers to engage in farming and ranching practices shall be for-
ever guaranteed in this state, subject to duly authorized powers, if any, 
conferred by article VI of the Constitution of Missouri.37 
 
 29. Id. § 537.296.3. 
 30. Id. § 537.296.5. 
 31. Id. § 537.296.6. 
 32. Julie Bosman, Missourians Approve Amendment on Farming, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 6, 2014) http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/07/us/right-to-farm-measure-passes-
in-missouri.html?_r=0. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Shoemyer v. Mo. Sec’y of State, 464 S.W.3d 171, 173 (Mo. 2015) (en banc). 
 36. MO. CONST. art. I, § 35 (West, Westlaw through July 7, 2016). 
 37. Id. 
4
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 3 [2016], Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol81/iss3/10
2016] TOO CLOSE FOR COMFORT 857 
While all fifty states have some type of a Right to Farm statute, Mis-
souri became the second state to pass such a constitutional amendment.38  
This amendment was not referenced in the Labrayere decision because it 
went into effect during the appeal process of the instant case.39 
B.  Eminent Domain 
Eminent domain was a major issue in the Labrayere decision.  The 
landowners maintained that the limitation on nuisance damages under section 
537.296 amounted to a taking of their land.40  The landowners argued that the 
statute violates Missouri’s eminent domain laws.41  Eminent domain has long 
been a hot topic in Missouri, particularly in regards to agricultural land.42 
The Supreme Court of Missouri has found a legitimate state interest in 
regulating and maintaining agriculture within the state.43  The court held that 
the state legislature can pass laws regulating land used for agriculture to pro-
tect the “traditional farming community.”44  In practice, this rationale has 
been applied broadly – in 1988, it was used to uphold a statute that forced 
foreign corporations to sell farmland in order to keep Missouri farms owned 
by Missouri families.45  The state’s interest in Missouri’s agricultural econo-
my is important when it comes to the exercise of eminent domain because it 
opens the door to an eminent domain argument when agricultural use infring-
es on others’ property rights. 
The Supreme Court of Missouri has ruled that the state does not itself 
have to take property in an eminent domain action.  Instead, it can delegate 
the eminent domain power to a municipality or another government subdivi-
sion.46  As long as a “considerable number” of the public is benefitted, the 
purpose of public use is considered fulfilled.47  Not every member of the pub-
lic has to be benefitted, and not every member has to actually use the land.48  
This allows eminent domain to be used in a broad variety of circumstances, 
including inoculating farmers from nuisance claims. 
 
 38. Bosman, supra note 32.  The first state to pass such a constitutional amend-
ment was North Dakota.  See id. 
 39. See Labrayere v. Bohr Farms, LLC, 458 S.W.3d 319, 319 (Mo. 2015) (en 
banc). 
 40. Id. at 326. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Stanley A. Leasure & Carol J. Miller, Eminent Domain – Missouri’s Re-
sponse to Kelo, 63 J. MO. B. 178, 187 (2007). 
 43. State ex rel. Webster v. Lehndorff Geneva, Inc., 744 S.W.2d 801, 806 (Mo. 
1988) (en banc). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 808. 
 46. State ex rel. Jackson v. Dolan, 398 S.W.3d 472, 476 (Mo. 2013) (en banc). 
 47. In re Kan. City Ordinance No. 39946, 252 S.W. 404, 408 (Mo. 1923) (en 
banc). 
 48. Dolan, 398 S.W.3d at 476. 
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A nuisance interferes with the use and enjoyment of the affected proper-
ty, causing it to be “taken” in the property owner’s eyes.  When eminent do-
main, even as a temporary taking, is invoked, the amount of compensation for 
the taking must be considered by the courts.49  In Missouri, permanent taking 
or damage to property requires just compensation (fair market value); alterna-
tively, temporary damage to property only requires compensation for the loss 
in value of the use of the property for the duration of the temporary taking.50  
In nuisance lawsuits, temporary taking is usually at issue, but a permanent 
taking claim may result if the nuisance is considered impracticable or impos-
sible to abate. 51 
Eminent domain is a serious tool used by and against Missouri’s farmers 
and is often involved in their legal battles.  Sometimes it is invoked in the 
taking of a farmer’s land for a public use.52  More often, however, it is in-
voked in a farmer’s alleged taking of his or her neighbors’ land through per-
manent or temporary damages to it.53  Labrayere examines and rules on the 
latter issue. 
C.  Equal Protection 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution created the doc-
trine of equal protection in the aftermath of the Civil War in an effort to en-
sure equal footing under the law between newly freed slaves and the white 
population.54  The use and perceived purpose of equal protection has evolved 
since that time to fulfill a much broader purpose.55  While the Equal Protec-
tion Clause was once used exclusively to protect minorities, it can now be 
used to challenge a minority’s protected status as well.56  The Labrayere case 
challenges the idea of rural landowners as a protected class.57 
 
 49. Byrom v. Little Blue Valley Sewer Dist., 16 S.W.3d 573, 577 (Mo. 2000) (en 
banc). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Frank v. Envtl. Sanitation Mgmt., Inc., 687 S.W.2d 876, 883 (Mo. 1985) (en 
banc). 
 52. See generally Harris v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Wyandotte Cty., 101 P.2d 898 
(Kan. 1940); Middletown Twp. v. Lands of Stone, 939 A.2d 331 (Pa. 2007); Wilson 
v. Fleming, 31 N.W.2d 393 (Iowa 1948). 
 53. See generally Bormann v. Bd. of Supervisors In & For Kossuth Cty., 584 
N.W.2d 309 (Iowa 1998); Lindsey v. DeGroot, 898 N.E.2d 1251 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2009); Moon v. N. Idaho Farmers Ass’n, 96 P.3d 637 (Idaho 2004); Johnson v. 
Paynesville Farmers Union Co-op. Oil Co., 817 N.W.2d 693 (Minn. 2012). 
 54. Christopher R. Green, The Original Sense of the (Equal) Protection Clause: 
Subsequent Interpretation and Application, 19 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 219, 221 
(2009). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Labrayere v. Bohr Farms, LLC, 458 S.W.3d 319, 331 (Mo. 2015) (en banc). 
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Missouri follows a tiered system of evaluation for equal protection 
claims.  Equal protection claims can be evaluated in one of two ways in Mis-
souri.58  Strict scrutiny is used if the classification disadvantages a “suspect 
class” or infringes on a constitutionally protected fundamental right, a high 
bar to reach.59  When strict scrutiny is used, the classification must be used to 
achieve a “compelling state interest” and must be narrowly tailored to achieve 
that interest.60  Suspect classes include race, national origin, or illegitimacy 
that “command[s] extraordinary protection” for historical reasons.61  Funda-
mental rights requiring strict scrutiny are interstate travel, voting, free speech, 
and other rights explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.62  In all other cir-
cumstances, the classification is evaluated using a rational basis test.63  To 
pass a rational basis test, the classification must only be rationally related to 
the achievement of a “legitimate state interest,” and deference is given to the 
legislature, a much easier standard for the law to meet than strict scrutiny.64  
The connection between agriculture and equal protection is not one usu-
ally argued in Missouri courts.  However, the Supreme Court of Missouri 
held in State ex rel. Webster v. Lehndorff Geneva, Inc. that agricultural laws 
can be evaluated with equal protection analysis.65  In Webster, the plaintiffs 
objected to a law that denied foreign corporations ownership of Missouri 
farmland.66  Foreign corporations that owned land prior to September 28, 
1975, could keep their land, but all foreign corporations that acquired it after 
that date would have to sell their land.67  Their claim was rejected based on 
the state’s rational interest in limiting future ownership of Missouri’s agricul-
tural land using a rational basis analysis.68 
Missouri has also tried to ensure equal protection by banning special 
laws when general laws can be used.69  Special laws have been distinguished 
from general laws by looking at the created category; if the categories are 
open-ended, the law is not a special law.70  A law is not considered to be a 
 
 58. Etling v. Westport Heating & Cooling Servs., Inc., 92 S.W.3d 771, 774 (Mo. 
2003) (en banc). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. (quoting Riche v. Dir. of Revenue, 987 S.W.2d 331, 336 (Mo. 1996) (en 
banc)). 
 62. In re Marriage of Woodson, 92 S.W.3d 780, 784 (Mo. 2003) (en banc). 
 63. Etling, 92 S.W.3d at 774. 
 64. State ex rel. Webster v. Lehndorff Geneva, Inc., 744 S.W.2d 801, 806 (Mo. 
1988) (en banc). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. MO. CONST. art. III, § 40(30) (West, Westlaw through July 7, 2016). 
 70. Kan. City Premier Apartments, Inc. v. Mo. Real Estate Comm’n, 344 S.W.3d 
160, 171 (Mo. 2011) (en banc) (quoting City of Springfield v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 
203 S.W.3d 177, 184 (Mo. 2006) (en banc)). 
7
Gibson: Too Close for Comfort
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
860 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
special law if it applies in the same way to an entire class and the classifica-
tion is reasonable.71  The same principles used in a rational basis analysis are 
applicable in evaluating “special laws” and classifications.72  In this way, a 
form of the rational basis test is applied to ensure fairness, even in laws that 
appear “special” on their face.  Laws making occupations classifications have 
been upheld because they are open-ended classes.73  Both equal protection 
and eminent domain shaped the decision in the instant case, Labrayere. 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
In 2015, the Supreme Court of Missouri heard a challenge to section 
537.296, a law protecting farms from nuisance suits, in the case Labrayere v. 
Bohr Farms, LLC.74  Neighboring landowners objected to the CAFO that 
Bohr Farms operated due to the odors and hazardous substances that came 
onto their land from the CAFO.75  The court denied the landowners’ first 
argument that section 537.296 was unconstitutional because it allowed pri-
vate takings.76  The landowners argued it was a private taking because there 
was no redress for the temporary loss of the use and enjoyment of their land 
at the hands of a private company.77  According to article I, section 28 of the 
Missouri Constitution, a private taking must involve: (1) property, (2) taken, 
(3) for private use, (4) without consent.78  The court disagreed with the land-
owners’ argument regarding private use.79  It found that if land is taken for 
something that creates a public advantage or benefit, the use is public, not 
private, regardless of who is actually using the property in question.80  The 
court stated that section 537.296.2 does not always authorize any private par-
ty or landowner to create a nuisance.81  In fact, it declares the creation of a 
nuisance presumptively unlawful and allows damages in that situation.82  
However, the court found that the promotion of the state’s agricultural econ-
omy was a sufficient public interest to deem any taking in pursuit of that in-
terest public and not private.83  Therefore, the court determined that one party 
 
 71. Alderson v. State, 273 S.W.3d 533, 538 (Mo. 2009) (en banc). 
 72. Savannah R-III Sch. Dist. v. Pub. Sch. Ret. Sys. of Mo., 950 S.W.2d 854, 
859 (Mo. 1997) (en banc) (quoting Blaske v. Smith & Entzeroth, Inc., 821 S.W.2d 
822, 832 (Mo. 1991) (en banc)). 
 73. Kan. City Premier Apartments, 344 S.W.3d at 171. 
 74. Labrayere v. Bohr Farms, LLC, 458 S.W.3d 319, 326 (Mo. 2015) (en banc). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 327. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 328. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
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“gaining” land and another party losing the loss and enjoyment of his or her 
land was not enough to negate the public purpose of the taking.84 
The court next rejected the landowners’ second point of appeal that sec-
tion 537.296 authorized taking without just compensation.85  The landowners 
argued that section 537.296.3 eliminated just compensation for the taking 
because it required that all claims subsequent to the first temporary nuisance 
claim be designated as permanent nuisance claims.86  By requiring this desig-
nation, the landowners believed it created an easement for others to perma-
nently interfere with the use and enjoyment of their property.87  The land-
owners also argued that barring recovery for loss of use and enjoyment dam-
ages eliminated the just compensation requirement.88  The court determined 
that the question of a permanent easement over the landowners’ land was not 
ripe for consideration, as this was their initial claim of temporary nuisance, 
not a subsequent claim.89  The court did not believe that the law allowed a 
regulatory taking that would require just compensation even when applying 
the temporary nuisance claim correctly.90  However, it reasoned that even if it 
did require just compensation, the statute allows damages for the diminution 
of rental value, which is the test used to determine temporary-taking compen-
sation.91 
The court next found that section 537.296 did not violate equal protec-
tion.92  The strict scrutiny test was not applicable because rural landowners 
and residents are not included in a suspect class.93  The court found no case 
law to support the proposition that rural landowners have been marginal-
ized.94  It claimed that, in fact, the very statute at issue in the case provided 
benefits to a large number of rural landowners because it protects them from 
nuisance suits.95  The court also found no fundamental rights requiring the 
application of strict scrutiny in the case.96  It found that the right to freely use 
and enjoy one’s property was generally considered fundamental, but if it were 
to be used as a justification for applying strict scrutiny, every property regula-
tion or use of eminent domain would require proof of a compelling state in-
terest.97  The court was unwilling to stray from prior decisions exempting 
 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 328–29. 
 89. Id. at 329. 
 90. Id. at 330. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 331. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 332. 
 97. Id. 
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from the strict scrutiny test property regulations and eminent domain.98  With 
no suspect class or fundamental right at issue, the court determined that the 
correct test to determine whether there was an equal protection violation was 
the rational basis test.99 
Under a rational basis analysis, the court gives deference to the legisla-
ture and presumes a statute satisfies rational basis scrutiny when it is rational-
ly related to a legitimate state interest.100  The challenger must overcome that 
presumption by showing that the statute is arbitrary and irrational.101  The 
court also found a legitimate state interest in promoting agriculture and main-
taining a strong agricultural economy within the state.102  It determined that 
the statute at issue accomplished those goals by lowering the risk of litigation 
for Missouri farmers.103  Further, it allowed recovery for property owners 
who have seen a diminution of their property value due to agricultural opera-
tions.104  The landowners did not convince the court that the statute was com-
pletely irrational, so section 537.296 passed the rational basis analysis.105 
The court next found that section 537.296 caused no due process viola-
tion.106  The landowners argued that the statute’s limit on damages destroyed 
the guaranteed right of enjoyment of one’s property and industry.107  This 
argument failed for the same reason the equal protection argument failed – 
the court found a legitimate state interest behind the statute and determined 
that the state interest and the statute were rationally related.108  Finally, the 
court did not find section 537.296 to be a special law.109  The landowners 
argued that it was a special law because it limited nuisance damages to cases 
where the farmer was the defendant.110  Special laws, those that apply to spe-
cific localities, individuals, or classes, rather than the state and population in 
general, are unconstitutional under article III, section 40 of the Missouri Con-
stitution.111  However, an exception exists for reasonable classifications used 
in a law that affect the entire class the same way.112  Laws with open-ended 
classifications are presumed by the court to be constitutional and do not qual-
 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 333. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 334. 
 112. Id. (quoting Glossip v. Mo. Dep’t of Transp. & Highway Patrol Emps.’ Ret. 
Sys., 411 S.W.3d 796, 808 (Mo. 2013) (en banc)). 
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ify as special laws.113  The court stated that if class members can change in 
status, the class is open-ended.114  The court ruled that the class is open-ended 
because Missourians can easily change between the farmer and non-farmer 
class by deciding whether or not to farm their land.115  The court held this 
class distinction was reasonable, and it was supported by a legitimate state 
purpose – promotion of the state’s agricultural economy.116  Therefore, the 
court concluded it was not an unconstitutional special law.117 
The court also found proper the grant of summary judgment on the neg-
ligence and conspiracy claims because section 537.296 only allows noneco-
nomic damage claims if they are independent of the nuisance claim.118  In this 
case, the court found they were not independent of the nuisance claim be-
cause they were based upon the same facts and grievances.119 
Judge Fischer wrote a concurrence, agreeing with the majority’s analy-
sis but stated that the analysis was unnecessary because there was no taking 
in the first place.120  He said a taking under eminent domain only occurs when 
a person’s protected property rights are infringed upon.121  He noted that the 
common law nuisance claim does not recognize loss of use and enjoyment as 
an infringement upon those rights.122  This rationale makes it clear that there 
is not an eminent domain or even an equal protection violation in section 
537.296, which protects both large and small farm operations.  The protection 
of farm operations of every size is a very important aspect of Labrayere.  
This case acts as a signal that all agricultural interests will be protected in 
Missouri, as does the new Right to Farm amendment. 
V.  COMMENT 
The Supreme Court of Missouri made the right decision in this case for 
several reasons.  This Part first considers the protection this statute grants to 
farmers, both large and small.  While the statute does establish important 
protections for big agriculture and corporate farms, it also protects the small 
farmer from crippling nuisance suits.  Second, this Part considers the influ-
ence of Missouri’s new Right to Farm amendment – which provides broader 
protection of agricultural interests than those provided by section 537.296.  
Third, this Part examines the eminent domain decision by the court in 
Labrayere.  Finally, it analyzes equal protection as applied to agricultural 
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laws.  The court’s decision in Labrayere shows the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri’s willingness to protect the state’s agricultural economy.  This decision 
indicates that future lawsuits of this nature will also be decided in favor of 
agricultural interests. 
A.  Protecting Large and Small Farmers 
All fifty states have some form of a Right to Farm law.123  Many people, 
including farmers, think laws like these are written to primarily protect corpo-
rate farmers – allowing their greed to continue unchecked at the expense of 
family farmers.  Some family farmers believe that these laws hurt small 
farms, as they ban or limit their ability to receive damages from their large 
corporate neighbors.  Farmers have long been a favored group in the United 
States.  This protection goes beyond insulation from nuisance lawsuits.  The 
federal government has passed laws excluding farmers from antitrust laws, 
allowing them to organize into cooperatives, and protecting them from lend-
ers seeking to collect debts while farmland value was depressed.124  The fed-
eral government also regularly passes farm bills to protect and subsidize the 
industry.125  Most of this legislation is meant to protect family farms from 
large external forces – like the dust bowl, refrigerated shipping, and, more 
recently, the rise of corporate farming – that change the agricultural econo-
my.126 
These protections are important because the U.S. agricultural industry is 
rapidly losing members.  The average age of the U.S. farmer has risen from 
50.5 years to 58.3 years since 1985.127  During this time, there has been more 
than a thirty percent increase in farmers over the age of seventy-five and a 
twenty percent decrease of farmers under the age of twenty-five.128  There are 
almost six times more farmers at or near the end of their careers (sixty-five or 
over) than farmers just beginning their careers (thirty-four or younger).129  
This is why it is so important to protect the agricultural industry and give 
farmers some peace of mind. 
These industry protections incentivize young people to begin careers in 
agriculture.  Who wants to join an industry that is rapidly declining, expen-
sive to get into, and constantly threatened by crippling and expensive law-
suits?  Missouri must do what it can to alleviate these concerns and keep the 
industry healthy and vital.  Small family farms are integral to American so-
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ciety and have been from the beginning of the country’s history.  To lose this 
rich tradition would be to lose an important part of American heritage and 
American life. 
As was seen in the debate over the Right to Farm amendment, some 
people believe the instant decision favors corporate farmers at the expense of 
small and family farmers.130  There may be some truth to these accusations.  
It is true that section 537.296 and the Right to Farm amendment protect cor-
porate farming interests.  In doing so, they also support the state’s agricultural 
economy by keeping large corporate farms in business in Missouri.131  Corpo-
rate farms can now operate in Missouri without worrying about large damage 
awards for nuisance suits.  However, it also protects the small farmer.  It is 
true that small farmers will no longer be able to sue corporate farms for mas-
sive damages they might incur from stream pollution or runoff, but they in 
turn will not be liable in similar lawsuits against them.132  Some small farm-
ers may be threatened by large corporate farms moving into the area.  How-
ever, a much more pressing concern for small farmers is the ever-encroaching 
urban areas which lead to more nonagricultural neighbors.133  These neigh-
bors are very likely to successfully sue for, and recover, large awards without 
section 537.296 and the Right to Farm amendment.134 
Before Right to Farm laws were even being considered in most states, 
this very scenario closed down a Massachusetts hog farm.135  In 1963, new 
neighbors successfully sued a local farmer for nuisance and obtained an in-
junction against the farmer, putting the farm out of business.136  More recent-
ly, a farming family in Indiana was sued because of its new hog finishing 
facility.137  The family followed all state rules and regulations in setting up 
the new finishing house.138  After a lengthy approval process, the neighbors 
sued them for nuisance based on the odor the neighbors feared it would bring, 
and the family is now faced with an expensive lawsuit that threatens their 
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entire farming operation.139  The family has turned to a crowd-funding web-
site to pay its ever-mounting legal bills and to keep its farm running.140  This 
is exactly the kind of suit from which the ruling in the instant case, section 
537.296, and the Right to Farm amendment will protect farmers. 
B.  The Influence of the Right to Farm Amendment 
Labrayere failed to mention the Right to Farm amendment because it 
did not apply retroactively, but it almost certainly influenced the court’s deci-
sion.  With the passage of the Right to Farm amendment, Missouri citizens 
reaffirmed their commitment to the state’s agricultural economy.141  The vote 
signaled that Missouri citizens support farming rights.142  This signal was 
almost certainly considered by the court in Labrayere, influencing the out-
come of the case.  Not only was this decision in keeping with the political 
climate of the state,143 but it also sends a signal to future litigants who might 
challenge the new Right to Farm amendment.  While the decision in no way 
explains or addresses the amendment, it does show the court’s willingness, or 
lack thereof, to invalidate laws created to protect the state’s agricultural econ-
omy. 
C.  Eminent Domain 
In the instant case, the court found that the question of eminent domain 
was not ripe for consideration because it was only a temporary nuisance 
suit.144  However, this topic is likely to come up again as the limits of the 
statute and the Right to Farm amendment are tested.  In the future, it seems 
quite possible that the courts could find an eminent domain-like taking when 
applying this statute to a nuisance lawsuit, based on the limitation the nui-
sance creates on the use of neighboring land.  This sort of conflict between 
urban and agricultural landowners is particularly common on the edge of an 
urban area, where new urban residents are moving to get just outside the 
city.145  Many state legislatures feared that Kelo v. City of New London would 
allow farmland to be taken for economic development and therefore created 
statutes to protect farmland.146 
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One argument advanced by the neighbors in Labrayere was that allow-
ing farmers to interfere with their property with no possibility for damages 
created an easement, which was a taking without just compensation.147  This 
could be compared to the inconvenience a railroad creates when it runs near 
someone’s property.148  Some industries are so important that they receive 
favorable legal treatment, including protection from nuisance suits.149  Some 
states use regulations to mandate reasonable farming practices and only pro-
tect farms following those practices from nuisance suits.150  Besides, farmers 
are not allowed to hop over the fence and start planting corn and grazing 
cows on their neighbors’ land.  Instead, farmers are allowed to use their own 
land to the best of their abilities, even if it creates a nuisance for some of their 
neighbors. 
Farm neighbors in Iowa have also claimed an unlawful taking of their 
land.151  Iowa’s Right to Farm statute originally included a blanket ban on all 
nuisance suits for all property involved in agricultural activities.152  The Iowa 
Supreme Court declared this statute unconstitutional because it enabled un-
lawful takings without just compensation since there was no possibility of a 
remedy.153  Section 537.296 differs from the Iowa statute because there is no 
blanket ban on nuisance suits.154 
Further, there is a distinct public use to an agricultural operation.155  The 
Supreme Court of Missouri has held that producing food for the population is 
a public purpose.156  However, a farmer versus farmer suit may complicate 
this law and this belief.  It is very common for large corporate farms to pol-
lute streams and fields used by smaller farms, which can lead to lawsuits.  In 
these cases, it will be difficult to conclude one farmer’s use is public without 
finding that the other’s use is as well, leaving one or both sides with no reme-
dy for the damages they face. 
Protecting farmers from nuisance suits does not automatically lead to an 
eminent domain conflict, but it may be viewed that way in some cases.  In 
those cases, the public purpose of food production can protect farmers against 
crippling nuisance suits.  This special treatment of agricultural interests has 
inevitably led to questions of fairness and equal protection. 
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D.  Equal Protection 
In Labrayere, the landowners argued a violation of equal protection had 
occurred based on agriculture’s special treatment under the law.157  The court 
found no violation of equal protection.158  This decision is very important for 
future agricultural laws and litigation.     
All over the United States, agricultural land use is recognized as a sepa-
rate category for nuisance laws.159  Much like the Missouri law, these laws 
seek to protect the agricultural economy by ensuring only the most grievous 
nuisances by agricultural landowners are punished.160  However, when an 
industry is singled out in this way, there is an unwritten conclusion that its 
activities and effects will never be unreasonable.161  If the state’s agricultural 
economy is so important that it warrants a heightened level of protection, it is 
difficult to imagine a scenario where a neighbor’s complaint would outweigh 
the state interest.  Undoubtedly, this could be pushed too far, as when Iowa’s 
lawmakers banned all nuisance suits against farmers.162  This example illus-
trates the importance of striking an appropriate balance between protecting 
farmers’ rights without infringing on other citizens’ rights. 
Agriculture was once a majority industry in the United States.163  In 
1840, farmers made up sixty-nine percent of the American labor force.164  
However, farmers today are an unmistakable minority in America, with just 
eight percent of the population involved in agriculture in 2012.165  As such, 
their rights must be protected to ensure the survival of such an important in-
dustry. 
Section 537.296 protects both large and small agricultural operations in 
Missouri.  This protection is essential for both the preservation and growth of 
Missouri agriculture.  The Right to Farm amendment is also important in this 
respect, but the Labrayere case ensures that these protections will survive 
against legal challenges.  Eminent domain and equal protection challenges are 
unlikely to defeat these protections.  The Supreme Court of Missouri did the 
right thing in Labrayere because the statute protects the state’s agricultural 
economy in a fair and just manner for the good of the general population.  It 
does not run afoul of eminent domain or equal protection laws.  The court 
correctly applied section 537.296 to prevent farmers’ neighbors from bring-
ing a nuisance suit against the farmer.  The decision is also an important indi-
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cation as to how future lawsuits concerning the protection of Missouri agri-
culture will be decided. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Agricultural nuisance will always be a problem in our society, as the ev-
er-present and necessary agricultural industry pushes against the borders of 
its neighbors and gets too close for comfort.  Section 537.296 helps to protect 
this vital industry by limiting crippling damages in nuisance suits for agricul-
tural operations.  The Labrayere decision enshrines this protection in case 
law and creates important precedent for Missouri agriculture.  With this deci-
sion, farmers are encouraged to continue their important work without worry-
ing about being pushed out by their new, disgruntled neighbors.  This case 
also signals how future cases regarding the Right to Farm amendment might 
turn out.  The eminent domain analysis in agricultural nuisance suits clarifies 
the practice and process for awarding just compensation.  The court’s posi-
tion on equal protection is important because it addresses not just this statute, 
but other protectionist agricultural laws as well.  The Labrayere case is sig-
nificant not only because of its decision upholding section 537.296, but also 
because of its signal to future farmer litigants.  
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